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Abstract
Purpose of Review This systematic literature review evaluates the potential of gambling monopolies to affect gambling harms. It
compares the occurrence of gambling harms in jurisdictions with gambling monopolies to jurisdictions with license-based
regimes.
Recent Findings The review identified 21 publications concerning three gambling-related harm indicators: problem gambling
prevalence, total consumption, and the appearance of conflicts of interest. Due to the dearth of literature, concept papers and older
publications were also included.
Summary Results show that there is a paucity of empirical research on the effectiveness of different regulatory regimes in
affecting gambling harms. Available research demonstrates that monopolistic regimes appear to perform somewhat better in
terms of problem gambling prevalence and total consumption but may also be more prone to conflicts of interest than license-
based regimes.Monopolistic configurations also differ between themselves, and issues such as availability, accessibility, product
range, scope of preventive work, monitoring, as well as the recognition of the public health approachmay better predict the levels
of harm in society than the existence of a monopoly.
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Introduction
The organisation of legalised gambling can take place through
different regimes, including prohibitions, monopolies, and
various forms of licensing. The most common forms of regu-
lation are public monopolies and licensing to the private sec-
tor, but even these basic regulatory models can differ depend-
ing on other policy choices such as product ranges, availabil-
ity, ‘responsible gambling’ policies, or ownership structures.
The choice of regime ranges between jurisdictions and be-
tween different forms of gambling. Approximately 20% of
the regimes globally are still public monopolies [1••]. Public
monopolies are particularly prevalent in lottery gambling
across jurisdictions, including the United States, but in many
European as well as Canadian and Australian jurisdictions,
also casino gambling may be subject to a local, often privately
operated, monopoly. The monopoly model also appears to be
gradually disappearing. Particularly in Europe, where gam-
bling monopolies were still the prevalent form of gambling
provision some 20 years ago [2], these have been replaced by
licensing models under which former monopolies have be-
come one of many licensed operators in many market seg-
ments. Currently only Finland and Norway operate fully mo-
nopolistic gambling regimes in Europe.
The choice of regime is partly constrained by the legal
status of gambling. This issue is particularly pressing in the
European Union (EU), where institutional constraints have
impacted national legislations on gambling via legislative
means. These include, inter alia, infringement proceedings
initiated by the European Commission, and court cases
brought to the Court of Justice of the European Union
(CJEU). The rulings of the CJEU, in particular, have gained
considerable importance in the choice of regulatory regimes in
the EU. In practice, the provision of gambling from other EU
countries can be restricted by means of a monopoly if this
restriction is justified in acceptable terms, including preven-
tion of gambling harms and promotion of public order [3, 4•].
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Furthermore, the CJEU has ruled that Member States need to
show a ‘causal link’ between restrictions in their gambling
legislation and their justifications [3]. Although the burden
of proof is minimal, this does put pressure on Member
States to show some connection between their gambling re-
gime and its potential to reduce harms [3].
Monopolies have become increasingly burdensome to
maintain particularly since the rise in popularity of online
gambling. Channelling consumption to the monopoly holder
is costly and may require heavy control measures such as IP
blocking [5, 6••, 7]. Monopolies are also increasingly difficult
to justify both legally and to consumers [6••]. European coun-
tries that have maintained their monopolies are increasingly
focusing their gambling legislation on the prevention of
gambling-related harms and the ‘particular capability of
monopoly-based systems to tackle these problems’ [8]. In
official justifications, monopolies are claimed to better
achieve the task of both harm reduction and harm prevention.
For example, in Finland, the Lotteries Act has shifted focus
from revenue collection towards consumer protection and
harm prevention to better justify the monopoly system after
an official note from the European Commission in 2006 chal-
lenging its premises [9].
Despite these official justifications, previous research liter-
ature has not been conclusive on whether monopolies are ac-
tually better capable of preventing or reducing gambling-
related harms than other systems (e.g. [10, 11] show some
support for this statement; [12–14] do not). It has been sug-
gested that licensed regimes may be more effective in
preventing harms despite increased availability, as licensing
allows regulating otherwise unregulated offshore provision
and a wider implementation of the so-called ‘responsible gam-
bling’ tools [15].
In the current study, we conduct a systematic review of
existing research evidence on whether gambling monopolies
address harm levels better than licensing systems. Resulting
from the limited space here, the focus of the paper is to com-
pare the two most prevalent regimes, mostly government-
operated monopolies and private licensed markets, although
other regulatory options would also be available.
The definition of harms in the study is wide, acknowledg-
ing that gambling causes a range of harms not only to individ-
uals but also to families, communities, and societies [1,
16–18]. Two previous review studies have addressed the issue
[19, 20] and one non-systematic summary of evidence [1••].
Planzer and Wardle [19] conducted a review of previous lit-
erature using the rapid evidence assessment method and con-
cluded that there was no empirical evidence available that
would directly address the effectiveness of regulatory regimes
in gambling. The reviews by Williams et al. [20] and
Sulkunen et al. [1••] both concluded that a less restricted ap-
proach is more likely to lead to gambling expansion, whereas
government-run gambling monopolies tend to offer more
prevention and treatment initiatives. At the same time, gov-
ernments may be more prone to conflicts of interest (COI), as
they run simultaneous roles as providers, regulators, and ben-
eficiaries of gambling [1, 21, 22].
As the existing reviews are already somewhat dated or non-
systematic, there is a need for an update. In the following, we
will first describe the methods and data, including the system-
atic search for evidence and inclusion criteria. The systematic
search yielded results on three categories of harm indicators
that we developed for the purpose of this review: the preva-
lence of problem gambling, total consumption (TC), and ap-
pearance of conflicts of interest. In the final section, we will
discuss the results and identify the main gaps in extant
research.
Methods and Data
We conducted a systematic review into the potential of gam-
bling monopolies to affect harms. Following the PICO mne-
monic [23], the intervention that we reviewed was therefore to
compare monopoly provision to a licensing system to deter-
mine whether a monopoly system performs better. The choice
to compare monopolies to licensing is motivated by the fact
that this is the most plausible alternative to monopolies, par-
ticularly in online environments [1••]. Studies that include
such a comparative setting fell into three categories: (a) those
comparing jurisdictions with a monopoly to jurisdictions with
licensing, (b) those comparing operators within a monopolis-
tic and license-based market segments in one jurisdiction, and
(c) longitudinal studies that examine the change of regime
within one jurisdiction. In order not to focus on predetermined
harms, we conducted a generic literature search on monopo-
lies and licensing systems. The utilised search terms were
‘gambling & monopoly’, ‘gambling & license/concession’,
and ‘gambling & regulation’. In addition, we alternated the
term ‘gambling’with different alternative forms: ‘lottery’, ‘ca-
sino’, and ‘betting’ (i.e. ‘lottery & monopoly’ and ‘lottery &
license/concession). In total, 16 search term pairs were used in
the following databases, using default search settings in the





& Web of Knowledge
& Google Scholar
If a search yielded more than 100 hits, only the first 100,
sorted by relevance, were considered for each search pair. The
included databases also included grey literature such as news-
paper articles and reports. Figure 1 presents the PRISMA chart
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of the search [24]. The 4342 identified records were first
cleaned from unrelated hits and duplicates, yielding a total
of 911 records. These articles were screened for their rele-
vance based on their abstracts, resulting in the exclusion of
further 770 papers. The inclusion criteria at this stage of ab-
stract reading were that the paper (1) appeared to concern the
regulation of gambling via a monopoly or license system; (2)
reported results on some outcome measures related to some
outcome measure related to individual, community, or society
level harms; (3) was available in a language that the authors
could read (English, German, French). At this stage, we also
decided to exclude papers regarding the levels of crime in
different regulatory systems.
The remaining samples of 141 articles were carefully read.
The final inclusion criteria were that the paper (1) compared
monopolistic and licensed systems in terms of their potential
to prevent harm and (2) gave either an empirical or an argu-
mentative result regarding how well monopolies affect harms.
Initially, we only planned to include papers that presented
empirical evidence to this effect, but as their number was very
limited, we followed the example of Planzer and Wardle’s
previous review study [19] and also included concept papers.
The final sample consisted of 21 papers, described in
Table 1. Of these, 19 were in English, one was in
German, and one was in French. Fifteen papers dealt with
European jurisdictions at least partly. This was presumably
due to the pressing nature of the monopoly topic in the
European Union following the contradictory status of mo-
nopolies in light of the principle of the free movement of
goods and services in the internal market. The remainder of
the sample focused on the United States, Canada,
Australia, and/or New Zealand.
The types of harm indicators addressed in these papers fell
into three categories: prevalence of problem gambling, total
consumption, and appearance of conflicts of interest. We in-
cluded each in this review, as they offer an encompassing
view of gambling harms at individual, community, and soci-
etal levels [1••]. In total, the 21 studies included 24 observa-
tions regarding these three topics. Problem gambling preva-
lence was considered an appropriate harm indicator, as it is
widely used in studies to describe individual-level harms.
Although problem gambling symptoms are not the same as
harms, they can be used as an indicator of them. Total con-
sumption has also been used as an indicator of a variety of
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population level harms, such as exposure and availability in
related fields, like in alcohol studies [25], but also increasingly
in gambling [1••, 26, 27]. The appearance of conflicts of in-
terest was also considered in the previous reviews byWilliams
et al. [20] and Planzer and Wardle [19] and was considered a
justifiable measure of systemic-level harms caused by gam-
bling: Gambling is lucrative business for governments and
private operators, which has been argued to have an impact
on regulatory choices [28–32]. The three harm indicators
differ profoundly as outcome measures. As recommended
for a realist systematic review approach [33], working with
heterogeneous methods and under various research para-
digms, we did not assess the quality of the research in a
hierarchical way. However, we did note whether the re-
search included empirical data and how large the dataset
was to better assess the results.
Table 1 Studies included in the systematic review
Reference Type of harm indicator
Adams, P. J., Raeburn, J., & De Silva, K. (2009). A question of balance: prioritizing public health responses to
harm from gambling. Addiction, 104(5), 688-691. [53]
Conflict of interest
Eadington,W. (2008). Gambling policy in the European Union: Monopolies, market access, economic rents, and
competitive pressures among gaming sectors in the member states. In Economic Aspects of Gambling
Regulation: EU and US Perspectives (pp. 71-90). Brill Nijhoff. [2]
Conflict of interest
Gainsbury, S., & Wood, R. (2011). Internet gambling policy in critical comparative perspective: The
effectiveness of existing regulatory frameworks. International Gambling Studies, 11(3), 309-323. [41]
Total consumption
Goodman, R. (1994). Legalized gambling as a strategy for economic development. United States Gambling
Study. [58]
Conflict of interest
Gu, Z. (2001). Performance gaps between US and European casinos: A comparative study. UNLV Gaming
Research & Review Journal, 6(2), 5. [42]
Total consumption
Hayer, T., Meyer, G. (2014) Die Prävention problematischen Spielverhaltens: Eine multidimensionle
Herausforderung. Journal of Public Health, 12 (5), pp. 293-303. [46]
Total consumption
Kairouz, S., Paradis, C., Nadeau, L., Tovar, M. L., & Pousset, M. (2016). A cross-cultural comparison of
population gambling patterns and regulatory frameworks: France and Québec. Journal of public health policy,
37(4), 467-482. [34]
Problem gambling prevalence
Kearney, M. (2005). The economic winners and losers of legalized gambling. No. w11234. National Bureau of
Economic Research. [47]
Total consumption
Kingma, S. (2004). Gambling and the risk society: The liberalisation and legitimation crisis of gambling in the
Netherlands. International Gambling Studies, 4(1), 47-67. [43]
Total consumption
Littlewood, M. (2011). Gambling and regulation: Why there is nothing to fear from liberalisation. Economic
Affairs (Institute of Economic Affairs), 31(1), 34-37. [38]
Problem gambling prevalence
Ludwig, M., Kraplin, A., Braun, B., & Kraus, L. (2013). Gambling experiences, problems, research and policy:
Gambling in germany. Addiction, 108(9), 1554-1561. [49]
Conflict of interest
Marfels, C. (1998). Government ownership and monopoly in the Canadian casino gaming industry.Gaming Law
Review, 2(1), 49-56. [50]
Conflict of interest
Marionneau, V & Kankainen, V. (2018). Beneficiaries of gambling and moral disengagement. International
Journal of Sociology and Social Policy. [59]
Conflict of interest
Marionneau, V. & Nikkinen, J. (2020). Stakeholder interests in gambling revenue: an obstacle to public health
interventions. Public Health. [60]
Conflict of interest
Marionneau, V., Nikkinen, J., & Egerer, M. (2018). Conclusion. Egerer, M., Marionneau, V. & Nikkinen, J.
(eds). Gambling policies in European welfare regimes. [35]
Conflict of interest; Problem
gambling prevalence
Miers, D. (1996). Regulation and the public interest: commercial gambling and the National Lottery. Mod. L.
Rev., 59, 489. [51]
Conflict of interest
Paldam, M. (2008). The political economy of regulating gambling." Gaming in the new Market Environment.
Palgrave Macmillan, London. 184-208. [39]
Conflict of interest; Problem
gambling prevalence
Planzer, S., Gray, H. M., & Shaffer, H. J. (2014). Associations between national gambling policies and
disordered gambling prevalence rates within Europe. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 37(2),
217-229. [4•]
Problem gambling prevalence
Rossow, I., & Hansen, M. B. (2016). Gambling and gambling policy in Norway—An exceptional case.
Addiction, 111(4), 593-598. [40]
Problem gambling prevalence
Simon, O., Blaser, J., Muller, S., & Waelchli, M. (2013). Réduction des risques et jeux d’argent. Questions
ouvertes par la révision du dispositif suisse. Drogues, Sante Et Societe, 12(2), 66-89. [45]
Total consumption
Valleur, M. (2015). Gambling and gambling-related problems in France. Addiction, 110(12), 1872-1876. [52] Conflict of interest
Young, M., & Markham, F. (2017). Coercive commodities and the political economy of involuntary
consumption: The case of the gambling industries. Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space, 49(12),
2762-2779. [48]
Total consumption
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Results
In the following, we will consider the results thematically
based on the three harm indicators found in the systematic
review: problem gambling prevalence, total consumption,
and appearance of conflicts of interest.
Problem Gambling Prevalence
Table 2 presents the results of the included studies comparing
the prevalence of problem gambling (PG) in monopolistic
versus license-based regimes. In total, six observations in the
data addressed this topic.
Two studies comparing population prevalence surveys
across countries [4•, 34] find that there is either no observed
difference between the two systems or that differences are not
related to systems but possibly prevention. Another paper
comparing case studies from Europe found that there also
appears to be no observable difference between how well
jurisdictions with licensed versus monopolistic regimes pre-
vent problem gambling [35]. Cross-jurisdictional compari-
sons of prevalence rates are complicated due to the imprecise
nature of population studies, including differences in screen-
ing instruments used, variance in samples, and heterogeneity
in outcome measures [36, 37]. These differences have been
argued to make it difficult to evaluate any cross-jurisdictional
differences, including regime efficiency, using prevalence
rates [37]. Kairouz et al. [34] also note that the levels of prob-
lem gambling within a population are probably not the most
appropriate measure for evaluating to comparative advantages
of gambling policies or regimes.
The remaining studies focused only in differences within
one jurisdiction (cross-sectional comparisons of market seg-
ments or longitudinal policy change studies). One study was a
concept paper, arguing rather a lack of evidence than any
difference between regimes in the case of the UK [38].
Another study compared levels of PG across two market seg-
ments in Denmark [39] and found that while PG prevalence
was higher for the products operated in the licensed market
than in the monopolistic market, this difference was likely to
result from the characteristics of these products rather than the
regime. Another paper compared prevalence of PG in Norway
before and after the monopolisation of the country’s EGM
market [40]. The monopolisation process appears to have re-
duced overall PG prevalence because it also influenced avail-
ability and product characteristics of EGMs.
Overall, the results indicate that monopolistic and licensed
regimes have some differences in terms of PG prevalence.
Monopolistic regimes or market segments appear to have lower
or similar levels of problem gambling than licensing, suggesting
that monopolies may be better at limiting this type of harm be-
cause of other policy-choices often connected to monopolies,
such as limited availability or prevention programmes.
Total Consumption
Eight study observations compared monopolistic and licensed
gambling regimes in terms of their potential to either increase
or curb TC. The studies and their results are described in Table 3.
Three studies address the TC on gambling across jurisdic-
tions [2, 41, 42]. Two of these [2, 41] found little difference
between regimes regarding TC, but the study by Gu [42]
Table 2 Study observations on the prevalence of problem gambling (PG)





Population studies in Québec (2009; N =
11,888) and France (2010; N = 27,653)
Lower levels of moderate-risk and PG in Québec (monopoly, 5.6 %)
than France (partly licensed, 10.8 %), but attributed to prevention
programmes rather than the monopoly.
Littlewood
(2011) [38]
UK Concept paper Argues that the liberalisation of gambling markets is not accompanied





Europe Previous literature (chapters in the edited
book)
Comparison of European country cases presented in the book argued to




Denmark Product level data from Danish gambling
authority
Danish data shows that PG levels are higher for products operated in
the licensed market (EGMs, casino, poker) than in the monopoly
market (lottery, scratch cards, sports betting).
Planzer et al.
(2014) [4•]
Europe Population studies in European countries (N
= 28)
No observed difference between PG prevalence rates between





Norway Population and youth studies on PG
prevalence 2002-2013 (N = 21); calls to
PG helplines
The monopolisation of the Norwegian EGM market, accompanied by
significant restrictions in availability and game characteristics,
reduced overall levels of problem gambling.
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argued that at least in the casino sector, monopolistic
European providers in France and the Netherlands appeared
to operate less expansionist business models resulting in lesser
TC than the competitive US casino sector. However, this ob-
servation is only based on one type of game product (casino
games) and dates back over 20 years, to a time when many
European markets were still considered to have a less
‘commercialised’ attitudes than today [e.g. 43, 44].
More recently, one study [45] compared TC on gambling
in Switzerland between the licensed casino market and the
monopolistic lottery market. Despite these differing products,
the study found that both monopolistic and licensed operators
operated in an expansionist manner looking to expandmarkets
and TC. Similar results have been argued in a number of
concept papers [43, 46–48], but two of these papers ([46]
comparing licensed and monopolistic offer in Germany and
[48] describing the Australian experience) argue that licensed
providers operating in a market environment and looking for
financial returns may be more expansionist than monopolistic
providers.
Overall, the results indicate that while both monopolistic
and licensed offer is connected to applicability of high TC and
expansionist attitude, this appears to hold more for licensed
operators than for monopolies.
Conflicts of Interest
Ten study observations concerned the potential of monopolies
versus licensing models to be subject to COI. The studies are
listed and described in Table 4.
Six of the included studies were concept papers. Of these,
five papers [39, 49–52] connected monopolies, particularly
when state-run, to a stronger COI in comparison to a licensed
system. This difference was mainly attributed to the same
entity (a state) taking several contradictory roles, including
operator, regulator, and beneficiary of gambling. One concept
paper [53] did argue that the state also has a similarly strong
interest in revenue generated by licensed operators, and that
any COI may be more strongly connected to total revenue
from gambling than the regime. Private companies can also
gain significant lobbying power and have been argued to fos-
ter ‘poisonous’ relationships with governments [54–56, 57•].
Only four studies used empirical evidence to investigate
the scope of the COI. As this type of harm is difficult to
operationalise, the studies are a mixture of focus groups and
financial records, complicating comparisons [35, 58, 59, 60•].
The results were nevertheless similar to those argued in the
concept papers: state-operated monopolies appeared to be re-
lated to a stronger COI than licensed regimes. At the same
Table 3 Study observations on total consumption (TC)
Reference Context Data Result
Eadington (2008) [2] EU, USA,
Australia, New
Zealand, Canada
Gross gambling revenues (GGR) by
sector in 2003 (other
countries)/2004 (USA) compared
to gross national products (GDP)
Regime does not appear to impact GGR/GDP ratio. GGR/GDP in
EU was 0.52 % (mostly monopolistic during the time); in the
USA 0.65 % (licensed). Ratio was higher in Canada: 1.11 %




Australia/Canada Prevalence of online gambling based
on previous literature
Online gambling prevalence in Canada (monopoly) in 2009 was 2.1
percent and in Australia (licensing) between 1-4 percent in 2010.
This suggests regulatory regime has very little if any impact.
Gu (2001) [42] United
States/France,
Netherlands
Financial figures of gambling
operators in Nevada and Las
Vegas, Partouche company (FR)
and Holland Casinos (NL) from
1998
Monopolistic casino operations (FR and NL) were less expansive
and were connected to lesser total consumption in comparison to
competitive casino markets (US).
Hayer & Meyer
(2014) [46]
Germany Concept paper In comparison to monopolistic offer in Germany (lottery, tote
betting), licensed offer (EGMs) is more expansive resulting in
increased TC.
Kearney (2005) [47] United States Concept paper Both state-run monopolies and private operations in the US run
expansionist gambling policies with an increased offer of
addictive games.
Kingma (2004) [43] Netherlands Concept paper Licensed EGM & lottery operators and monopolistic casino &
instant lottery operations both function in an expansionist manner
resulting in overall market growth, increased TC and increased
problems.
Simon et al. (2013)
[45]
Switzerland Financial data on gambling revenue
2003-2011
The legalisation of a licensed casino market (1998) and the
expansion of monopolistic lotteries market (2006) both
connected with strong market growth and expansion.
Young & Markham
(2017) [48]
Australia Concept paper Operators in private markets are more expansionist as they seek fast
returns to investment.
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time, a licensing system does not protect fromCOIs if industry
actors gain influence. As shown in the case studies analysed
by Marionneau et al. [35], the financial stakes of states, other
beneficiaries, as well as gambling industries create a variety of
interests that may have important influence on national gam-
bling legislations.
The results of this section indicate that although the empir-
ical basis is weak, government-operated monopolies appear to
be more connected to the presence of COI.
Conclusion
The current review draws three main conclusions. First, and as
was already established in the two previous reviews [19, 20],
there remains a paucity particularly regarding empirical re-
search on the effectiveness of different regulatory regimes in
preventing and addressing gambling harms.
Second, based on the evidence that is available, different
regulatory regimes appear to be connected to different types of
gambling harms. In this paper, we have reviewed existing
evidence on how regulatory models impact problem gambling
prevalence, total consumption, and the appearance of conflicts
of interest. In terms of problem gambling, monopolistic con-
figurations appear to be connected to lesser or at least similar
levels of harms in comparison to licensing systems. As for
total consumption, licensed markets may lead to increased
consumption in comparison to monopolistic providers, but
this also depends on what kind of business model operators
have. Regarding conflicts of interest, state monopolies have
been connected to stronger COIs due to their several roles, but
it has also been suggested that a similar situation may arise if
private operators gain significant political influence via lob-
bying or other connections with governments. This indicated
that fiscal motivations have had priority over advancing the
good of the society across regimes [61].
As the evidence base on the relative effectiveness of mo-
nopoly regimes to reduce harms is slim (or even contradicto-
ry), the third conclusion we draw is that instead of regulatory
models, it would be more pressing to compare how these are
organised. Even seemingly similar regulatory approaches can
differ considerably, as also noted by Planzer and Wardle [19].
Table 4 Study observations on conflicts of interests (COI)
Reference Context Data Result
Adams et al.
(2009) [53]
Australia/Canada Concept paper The scope of government COI connected to total revenue, not regime.
Any regime with a high TC is prone to COI.
Goodman (1994)
[58]
United States Key informant interviews (N = 50)
and review of cost-benefit studies
(N = 14)
States have a COI in both licensed and monopolistic regimes either via
strong industry lobbying or by direct implication as providers.
Ludwig et al.
(2013) [49]
Germany Concept paper The monopolistic model creates a stronger COI because the same state





Concept paper In Canada where the government both regulates and operates gambling







Key-informant interviews (N = 33) Beneficiaries of a gambling monopoly with an earmarked benefit system
(Finland) were more implicated in and less critical of the system than
beneficiaries in a partly licensed, tax-based model (France). The




Europe Financial statements of European
gambling operators (N = 10)
Stakeholder interests in gambling are strong both in licensed and
monopolistic markets, and this is likely to affect gambling policies




Europe Previous literature (chapters in the
edited book)
Comparison of European country cases presented in the edited book
shows that both licensed and monopolistic systems create COI, but
COI appears particularly strong when the government takes several
roles
Miers (1996) [51] UK Concept paper Argues that when the lottery is operated by a private operator, the COI of
the state is less pressing than in a case where the state is also the
operator via public monopoly.
Paldam (2008)
[39]
Denmark Concept paper The regulation of state-operated monopoly gambling is argued to be
'softer and more informal' than that of market-based operation,
creating a stronger COI.
Valleur (2015)
[52]
France Concept paper The strong COI related to the dual role of the state as an operator and
regulator connected to opening the French onlinemarkets to licensing.
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Even though gambling monopolies, particularly in the
European Union, are justified in terms of consumer protection
and harm prevention, monopolies may also operate in an ex-
pansionist manner. For example, despite being one of the last
remaining fully monopolistic markets in Europe alongside
with Norway, Finland also has one of the highest per capita
gambling expenditure rates in the continent [62]. Similarly, in
Sweden, Canada, or the Netherlands, state-owned or state-
controlled monopolistic companies have been argued to oper-
ate increasingly commercial attitudes [43, 44, 63]. In contrast,
monopolistic offer in Norway has been accompanied by com-
paratively effective harm prevention [40]. While the mostly
license-based regime in New Zealand has recognised gam-
bling as a public health issue already in early 2000s [53].
Based on these results, it appears that rather than the re-
gime, issues such as availability, accessibility, scope of pre-
ventive work, responsible gambling policies, the existence of
a sufficiently resourced independent monitoring body, as well
as the implementation of a public health approach to gambling
may better predict the levels of harm in society. For example,
Molinaro et al. [64] have found a negative association
between the expenditure on public health and levels of
PG prevalence in European countries, whereas Baxter
et al. [65] have found that rather than regimes, the fo-
cus on public health research appears to be a dividing
line between jurisdictions.
The current study has been limited to reviewing
existing research on the potential of gambling monopolies
to affect harms. We have only compared two models: the
typically state-run monopoly model and the market-based
licensed model within and between certain jurisdictions.
Further research should also take into consideration the
variations between these ideal types, including a compar-
ison of public and private monopolies, and different types
of licensing. The review has also not addressed the cau-
sality between regime and harm. It may be that a specific
regime is more prone to a certain type of harm, but it may
also be that the harms precede the choice of regime [cf.
66]. Nevertheless, the paper has given an overview on
existing evidence regarding the incidence of different
types of harms under monopolistic versus licensed gam-
bling systems.
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